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We develop a legal contract enforcement theory of the own versus lease decision.
The allocation of ownership rights will minimize enforcement costs when the legal sys-
tem is ine¢ cient. In particular, when legal enforcement of contracts is costly, there will
be a shift from arrangements that rely on such enforcement (such as a rental agree-
ment) toward other forms that do not (such as direct ownership). We then test this
prediction and show that costly enforcement of rental contracts hampers the devel-
opment of the rental housing market in a cross-section of countries. We argue that
this association is not the result of reverse causation from a developed rental market
to more investor-protective enforcement and is not driven by alternative institutional
channels. The results provide supportive evidence on the importance of legal contract
enforcement for market development and the optimal allocation of property rights.
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The transaction costs literature, which has its origins in the work of Coase (1937), has
emphasized the role of contractual incompleteness as a major source of transaction costs
(Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985; Hart, 1995). When a relevant aspect
of a transaction cannot be veri￿ed by a third party, the enforcement of a contract contingent
on that aspect becomes infeasible. And that has been found to have many implications for
the design of the organizational structure of ￿rms and other institutions.
While most of the literature has focused on the role of non-veri￿ability, in practice many
contracts are de facto rendered incomplete by the inability to enforce them in court in a
cost-e⁄ective manner. Djankov et al. (2003) provide evidence of a very large dispersion in
the level of e¢ ciency of courts around the world. Such di⁄erences in performance are likely
to account for di⁄erences in the way people structure their agreements and, ultimately, in
the performance and development of markets. The questions are: to what extent does law
enforcement matter, and what are the exact channels through which it does?1
In this paper we argue that, lacking alternative means of enforcement such as reputations,
market participants will tend to avoid the use of contracts when operating in an environment
with very ine¢ cient courts. As a result, the legal system may alter the allocation of ownership
rights.
To examine this claim we consider the housing market, where these e⁄ects are most
1Recent studies have emphasized various related mechanisms through which investor protection and
enforcement costs can a⁄ect the development of ￿nancial markets: expropriation of shareholders (La Porta
et al., 2002), the choice of capital structure (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002) or the design of private contracts
(Bergman and Nicolaievsky, 2004; Gennaioli, 2005). Eeckhout and Munshi (2005) describe how informal
￿nancial intermediaries emerged in India in response to ￿nancial regulation.
2transparent: essentially, a user of housing services can either buy a house or rent it from
another owner or landlord. Hence, studying the prevalence of rental properties will tell
us about the use of rental contracts and, hence, the allocation of ownership rights in such
a market. To the extent that contracts can be enforced, they will allocate these rights
in an e¢ cient manner to maximize welfare. This will involve some individuals purchasing
the houses they use, while others will buy access to them from a separate owner on an
occasional basis, using a rental contract. But when these temporary transfers of control are
costly to enforce, we will see departures from that optimal allocation. In particular, market
participants may decide to avoid contractual disputes by relying less on rental agreements
and, instead choosing a market structure that displays more direct ownership by the ￿nal
user.
We start by building a model of the choice between owning and renting.2 As argued by
Sinai and Souleles (2005), a user faces the following trade-o⁄: when renting, he faces the risk
in the ￿ uctuation of the rental price; instead, when owning, he avoids any risk if he stays in
the same location but faces the price risk for the sale of the house he owns if he moves out.
This gives us a theory of the size of the rental market. Those users who are likely to stay in
their current location will decide to buy in order to avoid the rental price risk, while those
who are likely to leave in the future will want to rent and avoid the house price risk.
We then extend the model to study the e⁄ects of the e¢ ciency of the legal system. For
this, we assume that enforcing a rental agreement (namely, repossessing one￿ s home in case
the renter threatens not to pay) can be done only at a cost. This gives renters bargaining
power, which they will use to reduce future rents. As a result, there will be a disparity
2Our model is similar to that of Ortalo-MagnØ and Rady (2002).
3between rents for existing and new tenants. While the latter have to pay the market rate,
the former have gained access to the property and can use the costly enforcement to their
advantage. Furthermore, since rents for existing tenants are lower than market rents, tenants
will tend to move less often. Finally, we show that because of the reduced mobility (which
eliminates the bene￿t of renting), and the increased cost for the investors, the size of the
rental market will decrease.
We then turn to an empirical test of the theory. What should the quantitative importance
of legal contract enforcement be? How big is the actual economic cost of repossession? The
answer to these questions is by no means obvious, since private substitutes to legal investor
protection exist. The Coasian view stresses the ability of interested parties to privately
contract in an e¢ cient way. Parties can design private contracts for those aspects not covered
by the law, and enforce them through more or less costly alternative means of enforcement
(such as reputation, repeated interactions, or other private actions and threats). To examine
the empirical bite of our contract-enforcement theory of the own versus lease decision, we
obtained data on the size of the rental market in 102 cities in 47 countries and measures of
judicial e¢ ciency constructed by Djankov et al. (2003), in particular, the time to repossession
and a formalism index. The former variable is an estimate of how many days it takes, on
average, for a landlord to regain access to his housing unit in case of rent non-payment.
The second variable (the formalism index) ￿measures substantive and procedural statutory
intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts,￿also related to the eviction of
a non-paying tenant (Djankov et al., 2003). The index can be seen as an indicator of the
extent of legal costs for the landlord in the case of rent non-payment and repossession.
We ￿nd that urban areas in countries with less e¢ cient legal contract enforcement (mea-
4sured by its high formalism and long times to repossession in the rental market) tend to
have a lower percentage of households living in rental units. We are able to rule out reverse
causality by using as instruments legal origins and the formalism index of a legal process
where the outcome is the collection of a bounced check, which should be unrelated to rental
market development. Since regulations and institutions pertaining to mortgage defaults,
rent controls, property registration, the labor market, social insurance, and the probability
of investors￿outright expropriation may all be correlated with both our measure of contract
enforcement and the extent of the rental market, we show our results to be robust to the
inclusion of variables that capture these factors.
There are two complementary reasons for focusing on the housing market. First, this
market is one of the most important in all countries. Housing is a primary consumption
necessity and the most important asset for many families that own. Existing research usu-
ally relates observable individual attributes to the propensity of a household to own versus
renting or other housing arrangements (e.g. Gyourko and Linneman, 1996). Some studies
have focused on the importance of credit access to account for housing tenure choices (as
in Linneman and Wachter, 1989). Chiuri and Japelli (2003) and Pence (2003) ￿nd that
defaulter-friendly foreclosure laws are associated with smaller mortgages and, consequently,
higher down-payment ratios. In countries with higher down-payment requirements, it takes
longer for the young to purchase a home. Chiuri and Japelli (2001), however, point out that
￿the average homeownership rate does not correlate with the size of the mortgage market, or
with other indicators of housing ￿nance.￿The authors argue that this is ￿evidence that high
down-payment ratios a⁄ect the timing of home purchases, but do not discourage people to
5become homeowners.￿ 3 More related to this paper, Wasmer (2005) has studied the impact
of regulations on the intensity of landlord screening, rents, and vacancy rates in the rental
market. He contrasts the more ￿ uid rental market of Quebec with its rigid counterpart in
France. The theoretical model in Wasmer (2005) points to additional ine¢ ciencies associ-
ated with costly contract enforcement in the rental market, conditional on renting. None
of the aforementioned papers attempt to address the general equilibrium question on the
relative extent of the rental versus property markets.4 We therefore develop a general legal
contract enforcement theory of the rental market that focuses on the individual own versus
lease decision.
The existence of a functional and e¢ cient rental market may be a major determinant
of economic welfare and development per se. In the presence of liquidity constraints, a
functional rental market may help young families to obtain adequate housing while saving
for a down payment. A thick rental market may also facilitate mobility within a city and
across regional labor markets, thus ￿greasing the wheels￿ of the national labor market.5
3This outcome is possible if young individuals stay for longer periods in their parents￿homes. It is
interesting to point out the possibility that the duration of mortgage foreclosure proceedings may be strongly
correlated with the duration of the repossession of a rental unit in the case of rent non-payment. Thus,
regulations that are less protective of investor rights in the rental and ￿nancial markets might be partially
accountable for both low average rental occupation rates and low homeownership among the youth in some
countries, such as Italy.
4Recently, Fisher and Ja⁄e (2003) have used data similar to ours to explain the determinants of home-
ownership rates in a cross section of world countries. These authors argue that their paper is ￿less successful
in providing a single equation model with comprehensive explanatory power of homeownership as a global
pattern.￿We will show here that the extent of legal investor protection in rental contracts is the most robust
explanatory variable for rental market shares accross the world.
5For instance, in a series of papers, Oswald (1996, 1997, 1999) showed a positive correlation between
homeownership and unemployment in several OECD countries. Oswald hypothesized that the correlation
may be a result of the lack of mobility in countries without a functional thick rental market. A recent
literature has examined the hypothesis in more detail. Flatau et al. (2002) do not ￿nd evidence consistent
with the Oswald hypothesis using Australian micro and regional data. However, recent studies by Brunet
and Lesueur (2003), Munch, Rosholm, and Svarer (2003), and van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) all ￿nd
a positive association between homeownership and unemployment hazard or duration using individual data
in di⁄erent European countries.
6Furthermore, the option to rent is valuable to households. If this option is not available,
some of them may not be able to diversify their portfolio and be forced to ￿over-invest￿in
real estate assets in order to satisfy their demand for housing services.
But there is a second reason to focus on housing markets. The law and ￿nance literature
has concentrated on the impact of investor protection laws on ￿nancial development. This
research ￿nds evidence of a positive correlation between investor protection laws and market
development (La Porta et al., 2000). This is, of course, consistent with a causal interpreta-
tion. Yet, several authors have argued that these correlations may be coincidental.6 One way
of making progress in this debate is by focusing on a di⁄erent market altogether. Given the
big number of market participants, and the limited extent of repeated interactions, alterna-
tive means of enforcement may have limited applicability here. Moreover, rental agreements
involve relatively simple contracts, compared to corporate or ￿nancial transactions. Both
these characteristics make the housing market a natural place to test for the shift in the allo-
cation of ownership rights in response to di⁄erences in the legal system regulating the market
and, more generally, to measure the sensitivity of the impact of legal contract enforcement
on market development.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop a model of
the housing market, and we derive the e⁄ects of the e¢ ciency of the legal system. Section
3 describes the data and presents the empirical results of the paper. Section 4 concludes.
Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
6Franks et al. (2003), for instance, show that the lack of legal protection during the ￿rst half of the
twentieth century in the UK did not hinder the country￿ s ￿nancial development. They explain this by the
existence of reputational mechanisms that substitute for public enforcement.
72 The Model
Consider a city with a local housing market in which all houses are identical and last for
two periods, t = 1;2. After the two periods, all houses are worthless to everyone. For
notational convenience, we set the interest rate to zero. At time t = 2, there is no di⁄erence
between buying or renting a house, as it can only be used for that period, and the rental
price is known.7 We take the rent in the second period e r2 to be random and exogenous, with
E [e r2] = r2.
There are two types of individuals: users, who value housing services, and investors, who
do not. Investors are wealthy and risk neutral. They do not consume housing services, but
they are willing to buy a house as long as they get a non-negative return by renting it. A
rental agreement is a contract by which the owner of the house sells access to that asset to
the user for a single time period in return for a payment at the beginning of the period.8
Since there is competition among investors, the rental rates in the ￿rst period will guarantee
zero pro￿ts and satisfy the equation: p = r1 + r2.9 Notice we are assuming there are no
frictions, such as search costs, in the rental market.
Users, on the other hand, are risk averse, with CARA utility u(x) = ￿e￿￿x and no time
discounting.10 In period 1 they consume only housing services, and in period 2, they enjoy
their housing consumption plus the leftover money. To obtain these services, they have two
options: either they buy a house or they rent one from an investor. We further assume that
7If the asset was in￿nitely lived, the equivalence between buying and renting would not arise in any
period.
8We rule out the possibility of signing a long-term contract. These contracts are rarely used in practice.
9Alternatively, we could assume that the rental prices r1 and e r2 are exogenous, and the adjustment takes
place through the price of the house. This yields equivalent results.
10By assuming CARA utility, we rule out income e⁄ects.
8the user always stays in the city at t = 1, and hence we normalize his ￿rst period valuation
of the location to zero. We will denote by ￿ a user￿ s risk premium for the rental price risk,
so that E [u(e r2)] = u(r2 ￿ ￿). With exponential utility, this premium is independent of the
level of income and valuations of the user.
At t = 2, a user values a house in the city at e v, which is random. This value may
depend on certain eventualities that can arise in the future, such as changes in preferences,
or geographic and amenity shocks. However, some of these eventualities may also depend
on certain individual characteristics, such as age, experience, and occupation. We model
these two aspects of mobility (general vs. idiosyncratic) by assuming two types of shocks.
With probability q, the value of staying in the city is e v = v ￿ x, where x has distribution
F (x). With probability 1 ￿ q, the value is v ￿ ￿, with ￿ ￿ 0. The population of users is
heterogeneous, with ￿ being distributed continuously in the interval [0;￿].11 The user also
has the option to move to a di⁄erent city at t = 2. For simplicity, this alternative location
has a ￿xed value of v and ￿xed rental rates of r2.12 Hence, with probability 1￿q, some users
will have a very stable valuation for a house in the city, while others receive very negative
shocks and, hence, would like to leave for the alternative location.
We assume the user learns the realization of the valuation at an intermediate date t = 11
2,
at which point he must decide whether to move or not, before knowing the realization of
the rental price. This allows us to examine mobility in a parsimonious way.13 We further
11The ￿rst type of shock allows us to discuss mobility in a continuous way, while the second introduces
heterogeneity among users. Most of the results in the paper (most notably, propositions 1, 2, and 3) are true
under very general assumptions about the structure of the shocks to the valuation of the city. Adopting this
particular form simpli￿es and makes more intuitive the analysis in proposition 4.
12The model generalizes to the case of a random rental price in the alternative location, as long as this
price is not perfectly correlated with that of the city.
13If the user learns the valuation at t = 2, the mobility decision must take into account the realization of
the rental price as well, which, for the purpose of this paper, adds unnecessary complications to the model.
9assume that v ￿ ￿ ￿ v, so that a user with e v = v would rather stay than leave both when
owning and when renting.
2.1 Owning vs. Renting
As long as housing prices (p) satisfy the condition p = r1 + r2, investors make zero pro￿ts
and are willing to supply as many rental properties as demanded by the users. Hence, the
rental market is determined by the number of users who prefer to rent rather than own at
the prevailing house price p and rental prices r1 and r2. The decision of whether to own or
to rent is made at t = 0, before the realization of the valuation and rent shocks.
At t = 11
2, a user must decide where to live in the next period. If he is renting from an
investor-owner at t = 1, he gets value e v when staying but must su⁄er the rental price risk
￿. Instead, if he leaves, he gets the value v. Hence, he will stay at the same property if
e v ￿ ￿ ￿ v and will leave for the alternative location otherwise. If we let b ￿ = (v ￿ ￿) ￿ v,
then the user stays whenever the shocks x or ￿ are below b ￿. The ex-ante expected utility of
renting takes the following form:
U
R (r;￿) = q ￿
"Z b ￿
0






￿ u(v ￿ r)
#
(1)
+(1 ￿ q) ￿ maxfu(v ￿ ￿ ￿ r ￿ ￿);u(v ￿ r)g
where r = r1 + r2. With probability q, the user receives a continuous shock. He stays if the
shock is low (x ￿ b ￿) and leaves if it is high. Alternatively, with probability 1￿q he receives
his individual shock ￿. If that shock is low (￿ ￿ b ￿), he will stay, but otherwise he leaves.
An analysis of this case can be found in Ortalo-MagnØ and Rady (2002 and 2005).
10Notice that the user faces the rental price risk only when he decides to stay in the same
location.
In contrast, if a user owns the house, he faces a di⁄erent type of risk when changing
location: uncertainty about the ￿nal price obtained from the sale of the house. Since ￿ is
the risk premium, the user-owner leaves if and only if e v ￿ v ￿ ￿. He remains in the initial
house more often than when renting, giving up the higher value of the alternative location
in order to avoid the risk of selling the house. Letting ￿ = v ￿ (v ￿ ￿), the user stays if the
shocks are lower than ￿. His expected utility of owning is:
U
O (p;￿) = q ￿
"Z ￿
0






￿ u(v ￿ p ￿ ￿)
#
(2)
+(1 ￿ q) ￿ maxfu(v ￿ ￿ ￿ p);u(v ￿ p ￿ ￿)g
It is easy to see that UR is decreasing in r. Therefore, a user is willing to buy a house at
t = 0 whenever UO (p;￿) ￿ UR (r;￿) at p = r (at the rental price o⁄ered by an investor, the
user values buying more than renting). We will assume that UO (p;0) ￿ UR (r;0), so that a
user with ￿ = 0 prefers to own rather than rent.14
As in Sinai and Souleles (2005), this gives rise to several trade-o⁄s that determine the
desirability of owning versus renting. When owning, the user avoids the rental risk as long
as he stays in the same location (u(e v ￿ p) > u(e v ￿ r ￿ ￿) when p = r). However, he faces
the additional price risk of selling the house when moving (u(v ￿ p ￿ ￿) < u(v ￿ r) when
p = r). Furthermore, since he moves less often, he misses out on some gains from higher
14This would be the case, for instance, if q is su¢ ciently close to zero, since u(v ￿ ￿ ￿ p) > u(v ￿ ￿ ￿ r ￿ ￿)
when ￿ = 0. It can also be shown this holds when F (v ￿ v) = 1, so that the shock x is not too large.
11valuations in a di⁄erent location. The size of the individual shock ￿ determines the balance
of these trade-o⁄s at t = 0. When ￿ is low, the user would value ownership highly, as he
rarely sells the house. In that case, the user would rather avoid the rental price risk by
buying the house. In contrast, when ￿ is high, the user is more likely to move. Renting can
then eliminate the risk associated with selling the house. The following result follows:
Proposition 1 There exists an individual type ￿
￿ > b ￿ such that the user buys a house if
￿ ￿ ￿
￿, and rents otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix.
Renting gives ￿ exibility to those who may not be staying in the same location in the
future, by allowing them to avoid the risk associated with selling a house. On the other
hand, owning provides security for those who plan on staying in the same house for the long
term, by allowing them to avoid the rental price risk. This result provides a theory that
predicts when we should see a user-owner and a user-renter. Furthermore, since we assume
that the users￿￿￿ s are continuously distributed on [0;￿], ￿
￿ provides a measure of the size
of the rental market. The higher ￿
￿ is, the smaller the rental market.
2.2 Ownership and the E¢ ciency of the Legal System
Until now we have made two implicit assumptions. The ￿rst, is that property rights are
protected. In e⁄ect, we are assuming there is an e⁄ective police force that prevents others
from taking ownership away from either the user or the investor. We will maintain this
assumption for the rest of the paper.
12A second assumption, which we relax now, entails the enforcement of the rental agree-
ment. When an investor acquires the house, it signs a contract with the user by which he
is allowed access to the property (and its use) in return for the payment of the rental price.
This can be easily enforced by requiring advance payment. After the ￿rst period, the investor
may require the user to vacate the house (or have the user pay the rent for the following
period). However, once the user has been granted access to the property it may be di¢ cult
for the investor to evict him. This may involve a contract dispute that has to be resolved in
court. To the extent that the legal system is perfectly e¢ cient, the investor would be able
to regain access to the property quickly and rent it to a new user. But this process may be
slowed down if the system is ine¢ cient.
To model the e⁄ects of the e¢ ciency of courts, we assume the investor must pay a cost c if
he wants to gain back access to the property when the tenant does not pay rent for the second
period and would not leave the property (without paying this cost, the investor cannot evict
the tenant). Notice that this is a problem that a⁄ects the rental market exclusively, since
a user-owner does not contract with anyone. Therefore, the actions of the user-owner are
una⁄ected, and his expected utility is still given by (2).
On the other hand, the user-renter will pay the ￿rst period rent. But he may threaten
the investor with non-payment at t = 2 unless the rent is reduced. If he is evicted, he could
still rent another property at the ongoing rate. The investor, in case of non-payment, could
pay the cost c to evict the user and rent it to someone else at the market rate, making e r2￿c.
However, paying the enforcement cost is ine¢ cient, and they will therefore renegotiate the
rent. If the user has all the bargaining power, the ￿nal second period rent will be e r2 ￿ c.15
15We assume this for simplicity. It would be enough if the user had a positive bargaining power for the
13Foreseeing this renegotiation, the user will decide to leave at t = 11
2 only when e v+c￿￿ < v.
Hence, compared to the case of a perfectly e¢ cient legal system, he stays in the same property
too often, to bene￿t from the low future rents.16 This results in the following expected utility:
U
R (￿;c) = q ￿
"Z b ￿(c)
0






￿ u(v ￿ r)
#
+(1 ￿ q) ￿ maxfu(v ￿ ￿ ￿ r ￿ ￿ + c);u(v ￿ r)g (3)
where b ￿ (c) = v ￿ v ￿ ￿ + c denotes the new threshold for the mobility choice.
We can summarize this in the next proposition:
Proposition 2 The rental price for ￿rst-time renters is higher than for those who remain
in the same house, and this di⁄erence is increasing in the ine¢ ciency of the legal system.
Furthermore, for a given ￿, the mobility of the renter is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency of the
legal system.
The ine¢ ciency of the legal system increases the bargaining power of a renter once he
has been granted access to the property (as it is costly for the investor to regain access). As
a result, leaving that house becomes more costly for the user, as he must give up a property
with a rent below the market price. Unless the bene￿ts of leaving are large, he will not do
so, and hence mobility is reduced.
results to hold.
16Notice we are assuming that the Coase theorem fails here, since mobility is ine¢ cient. The landlord
could try to bribe the user to leave when e¢ cient by o⁄ering a payment of e v+c￿￿￿v whenever e v+c￿￿ ￿ v
and e v ￿ ￿ < v. This, however, would be infeasible if the landlord does not observe the realization of the
shock, and hence there is ex-post asymmetric information (even if, ex-ante, the landlord is perfectly informed
about the distribution of shocks). Making this assumption would give us ine¢ ciently low mobility as well,
but would unnecessarily complicate the model. For simplicity, we assume no bribe is o⁄ered at all.
14To gauge the e⁄ects on the size of the rental market we study two cases. First, we consider
the possibility that investors can discriminate among di⁄erent types of users. When investors
can charge di⁄erent rents r1 (￿) to di⁄erent users, these satisfy:
p = r1 (￿) + r2 ￿ c ￿ Pr
￿




e v ￿ v ￿b ￿ (c) j ￿;c
￿
is the probability that a user-renter with a shock ￿ stays in
the same property at t = 2, given the value of c. In this case, users end up paying the
total (expected) cost of the ine¢ ciency in the form of higher ex-ante rents. Consequently, an
increase in c does not change the expected rent payment to the landlord but decreases the
desirability of renting for two reasons. First, the increase in c shifts consumption of the renter
from the low utility state where he leaves (he pays higher ￿rst period rents and high second
period rents), to the high utility state where he stays (lower second period rents outweigh the
increase in ￿rst period rents). Because of risk aversion, such a shift in consumption ought
to decrease utility.
More important, an ine¢ cient legal system decreases the mobility of renters and, hence
eliminates the bene￿ts renting has over owning the house (namely, the ￿ exibility of being
able to move without su⁄ering extra risks). Indeed, if c is large enough (in particular, bigger
than ￿ and the upper support of F (x)), the user never leaves the property. In that case,
the rent the investors require satis￿es p = r1 + r2 ￿ c, and the utility of renting becomes
q ￿ Ex [u(v ￿ x ￿ p ￿ ￿)] + (1 ￿ q) ￿ u(v ￿ ￿ ￿ p ￿ ￿), which is clearly lower than the utility
of owning. Hence, the user would rather purchase the house and avoid the rental price risk
in the case of staying in the same location while still enjoying the bene￿ts of having some
15mobility.
While the ￿rst e⁄ect (risk aversion) is stronger when the ine¢ ciency is small, the second
becomes more relevant as the ine¢ ciency increases. Together, both these e⁄ects make the
size of the rental market decrease with the ine¢ ciency of the legal system.
Proposition 3 When investors can discriminate among users, there is a ￿
￿
D (c) such that a
user buys a house if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
D (c). Furthermore, ￿
￿
D (c) is increasing in c, so the
size of the rental market is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency of the legal system.
Proof. See the appendix.
In the previous discussion we have emphasized the role of the moral hazard problem
that arises when the legal system is ine¢ cient (namely, the fact that the agent renegotiates
the rent down, and hence he is less likely to move out). However, when investors cannot
discriminate among users, they must o⁄er the same rent r1 to all, so that




e v ￿ v ￿b ￿ (c) j ￿;c
￿i
where the expectation is taken over all ￿￿ s that rent a property. This can give rise to adverse
selection e⁄ects that complicate the analysis. An investor foresees the average behavior of a
user-renter. And this determines the ￿rst period rent. But the user that bene￿ts the most
from the rent drop at t = 2 is the one that is least likely to leave. The speci￿cation of
the shocks in the model makes the analysis more intuitive, since Pr
￿
e v ￿ v ￿b ￿ (c) j ￿;c
￿
can








+ (1 ￿ q), when ￿ ￿ b ￿ (c) and ￿ < b ￿ (c),
respectively. When c is low, users with low mobility needs (who have ￿ < b ￿ (c)) ￿nd owning
16more desirable, and the lower rents they might get when renting do not compensate them





, is the same for all of them, the ￿rst period rent fully re￿ ects the expected reduction
in future rents. This resembles exactly the perfect discrimination case, and therefore, the
same e⁄ects push the size of the rental market down.
As c increases, however, investors may start to face adverse selection problems. If all
renters have ￿ ￿ b ￿ (c), r1 will re￿ ect the low probability of su⁄ering the cost c. Then,
those with ￿ < b ￿ (c) may deviate and start renting. If they pass for a highly mobile user,




= 1, all of them
will start to deviate at the same time.17 This, however, cannot be an equilibrium as the
investors would make negative expected pro￿ts. Rents would have to be adjusted upward to
discourage ￿bad￿users from renting and make sure that only those who really value mobility
do rent. However, this will further motivate more of the initial renters to drop out of the
rental market and buy instead. The possibility of facing adverse selection can therefore make
matters worse for the investors and further constrain the development of the rental market
as rents are pushed higher. The following result then follows:










Then, when investors cannot discriminate among users, there is a ￿
￿
ND (c) such that a user
buys a house if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
ND (c). Furthermore, ￿
￿
ND (c) is increasing in c, and there
is a c such that ￿
￿
ND (c) = ￿
￿
D (c) for any c ￿ c, and ￿
￿
ND (c) ￿ ￿
￿
D (c) for any c > c.
17This condition states that the shock x cannot be too large (x ￿ ￿). It is su¢ cient to guarantee that any
￿ < b ￿ (c) strictly prefers to rent if and only if c > ￿=(1 ￿ q). As a result, when c ￿ ￿=(1 ￿ q) they would
rather own. But as soon as c goes slightly above ￿=(1 ￿ q), all ￿ < b ￿ (c) would want to start renting.
17Proof. See the appendix.
In general, it is still going to be the case that there is a c such that ￿
￿
ND (c) = ￿
￿
D (c) for any
c ￿ c. The two conditions in the proposition guarantee that only those with ￿ > b ￿ (c) ever
rent, even though the possibility of an adverse selection problem constrains the equilibrium
and depresses the rental market further when c > c. When these conditions fail, some
pooling may start to arise, by which some users with low mobility rent alongside those with
high mobility. But eventually, as c grows larger, the rental market will again decrease.
When the legal system is ine¢ cient, the investor is held up by the user-renter. This makes
it more likely that a user will want to own the house, instead. Moreover, the disparity that
arises between the second period rent and the market rent decreases the mobility bene￿t
of renting and generates adverse selection e⁄ects when investors cannot discriminate among
users, as those that stay more often try to rent in order to capitalize on the ine¢ ciency.
Both these ine¢ ciencies hinder the development of the rental market.
There may, however, be additional reasons why the rental market is negatively a⁄ected.
For instance, investors may not be able to fully charge the expected future costs up front
through higher initial rents. This would reduce their return and, therefore, their willingness
to invest in property. Additionally, bargaining over future rents may be very costly. This
could arise if the user can make threats of non-payment, delay the payments, abuse the
property, and so on. The landlord, on the other hand, can threaten with legal action, stop
making repairs, or make unpleasant unexpected visits to the property. These will add to the
costs of renting, further depressing this market.
183 The Data
The main dependent variable of interest is the percentage of households that rent (i.e., the
relative size of the rental market). This variable, which we call tenancy, is obtained from
three related sources. The 1998 Urban Indicators Database (UID) from the UN provides an
estimate of this variable at the city level for a sample of major world cities in 1998. The
same database provides other variables on the cities￿characteristics. As a robustness test
we also use the 1993 version of the UID. Although the legal system data set that we use
corresponds to a somewhat later period, the 1993 UID includes speci￿c detail as to the size
of the private rental market in each city, which allows us to address the issue of publicly
provided rental housing. Moreover, the city coverage is not the same as in the 1998 UID,
which provides us with an out-of-sample test for our econometric model. Data with estimates
on homeownership rates at the country level are obtained from the UN Habitat database for
a small sample of countries.
We match these housing data with the ￿Courts and Judicial E¢ ciency for 109 coun-
tries￿data set from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003). The data
set contains several variables that are of vital importance for our estimation. The main
explanatory variables of interest will be the time to repossession and the formalism index.
The former variable is an estimate of how many days it takes on average for the landlord
to regain access to his housing unit in case of rent non-payment. A faster execution of the
repossession judicial process will be interpreted as a measure of better contract enforcement.
The second variable (the formalism index pertaining to the repossession process) ￿measures
substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial
19courts. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control or intervention
in the judicial process￿(Djankov et al., 2003). The index can be seen as an indicator of
the extent of legal costs for the landlord in the case of rent non-payment and repossession.
Thus, the higher the indicator, the lower the e¢ ciency of contract enforcement in the rental
market. The index is formed by weighting the following elements of the legal process: (i)
professional vs. laymen involvement in the process, (ii) use of written vs. oral elements, (iii)
legal justi￿cation, (iv) statutory regulation of evidence, (v) control of superior review, (vi)
engagement formalities, and (vii) independent procedural actions. Djankov et al. (2003) also
provide data on the formalism index of a legal process where the outcome is the collection
of a bounced check. We will use this variable as an instrument for contract enforcement in
a country that should be unrelated to outcomes in the rental market. Botero, Djankov, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, (2004), provide the data on labor market regulation.
Similarly, we obtain data from the Heritage Foundation￿ s index of property rights in 1997,
from La Porta et al. (1999).18 Data on the protection of creditor￿ s rights in collateral-
ized lending are obtained from the World Bank "Doing Business" (DB) database, 2005, and
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006). The data are based on the study of existing laws and
survey responses. We construct an index that measures the degree to which laws facilitate
collateral lending. The original DB index is formed by adding several bankruptcy law and
collateral law subindexes. By subtracting the bankruptcy subindexes in Djankov, McLiesh,
and Shleifer (2006) we obtain an index that is solely focused on collateral lending practice
and therefore germane to mortgage markets. The DB database is also the source for our
18The index has been previously used in empirical research and correlates well with other indicators of
property rights protection (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
20measure of the e¢ ciency of the property registration process in each country. Additionally,
we obtained data on rent controls for a set of 53 countries from Malpezzi and Ball (1991).
Finally, we also use other country data from the World Bank. A more detailed description
of the data and their sources for all variables used in this paper can be found in the Data
Appendix. Figures 1 to 3 show plots with the share of renter households (Figure 1- UID
1998), share of households in private rental housing at the city level (Figure 2 - UID 1993),
and urban homeownership rates at the country level (Figure 3 - UN Habitat 2001) on the
vertical axis, and the legal system formalism index of rental contract enforcement on the
horizontal axis. It is apparent that in countries with less e¢ cient contract enforcement the
share of rental housing is substantially smaller. The next section veri￿es that, indeed, this
initial impression is both statistically and economically signi￿cant.
3.1 OLS and IV estimates
Our estimates correspond to the basic model in:
tenancyki = ￿ + CEi￿ + Xi￿ + Zki￿ + "ki
where the subscripts k and i denote city and country, respectively, tenancy is the share of
renter households, CE stands for the (alternate) measures of contract enforcement e¢ ciency
in the country, X is a vector of country characteristics, Z denotes city characteristics, and
" is an error term. Estimated standard errors are clustered by country to take into account
the correlation between outcomes within the same country (note that the CE indexes do not
vary within a country). We perform the regressions with some of the relevant right-hand-side
21variables in logs. We have a sample with 102 cities in 47 countries.
Table 1 presents the results from our baseline speci￿cation. In columns 1, 2, and 3 we
simply correlate the two measures of contract enforcement with the tenancy rate in 1998
and ￿nd that the coe¢ cients are generally signi￿cant and have the expected sign: countries
with poorer enforcement of rental market contracts (longer times to repossession and higher
formalism indexes) tend to have relatively smaller rental markets. In column 4 we add other
major country characteristics: GNP per capita and population density and obtain similar
results. The results in column 4 suggest that the broader measure - the formalism index - may
capture better the quality of contract enforcement. Therefore, we focus on this measure in
the remainder of the paper.19 The impact of e¢ cient contractual enforcement is economically
signi￿cant: a one-standard-deviation change in the formalism index is associated with a -0.33
standard deviation change in the rental market share (a reduction of about six percentage
points). In columns 5 through 12 we include other explanatory variables at the city level:
crime (related to general enforcement of property rights), average travel time to work, access
to water, under 5 mortality, median income, and government taxation.20 Since there are
many missing observations for each of these explanatory variables, we include them one-
by-one sequentially. None of these variables enter signi￿cantly in the regressions (except
for the logarithm of local government revenue per capita ￿the larger the local government,
the smaller the rental market). While the country sample sizes change in each estimation,
19Both measures are highly colinear proxies of the actual extent of contracting investor protection in this
market. We always obtained similar results when using the duration measure instead.
20We tried including other country-speci￿c variables such as life expectancy, death rates, the Gini index,
percentage urban population, percentage population aged 15-64, percentage of population aged 65 and
beyond, rule of law and order, corruption, latitude, and continent ￿xed e⁄ects. These never signi￿cantly
altered the results for the main variables of interest. In all cases (except for the measure of corruption) these
variables did not enter signi￿cantly in the regressions.
22and estimated coe¢ cients on the regulation variables change accordingly with their standard
errors, the qualitative conclusions do not change at all. E¢ cient legal contract enforcement
is associated with more developed rental markets.
An obvious problem with the interpretation of the results in Table 1 is that the causation
may be the opposite of the one we propose. In countries with a more developed rental market,
we may expect landlords to constitute a more e⁄ective pressure group for the enactment
of protective investment regulations related to contract enforcement in the rental market.
Thus the causality may be going from market development to the law. This causality issue is
similar to that in the literature on the impact of legal systems on ￿nancial development. To
address this issue we use the formalism index applicable to the case of a bounced check as an
instrument in Table 2, columns 1 and 2. This variable captures how di¢ cult it is to obtain
enforcement of collection of monies after a check used for the payment of goods and services
is bounced. This is an interesting variable for our purposes. It is clearly related to the general
climate of investment protection and e¢ ciency of the court system in a country. However,
it is unlikely to be driven by the percentage of households that live in rental units.21 For
ease of exposition, we omit the regressions that use city-level controls.22 In Table 2, columns
3 and 4, we also present the results of regressions that use dummies for the legal origin of
each country as instruments for the investor protection variables in the housing market. We
are agnostic about the assumption of exogeneity of the legal system adoption with respect
to general economic development. However, this seems to be a good set of instruments with
21Incidentally, it is interesting to point out that if we include both measures of contract enforcement in
the OLS regressions, only the rental market one is signi￿cant. It is the speci￿c legal contract enforcement
environment in the rental market that matters for rental market development.
22The results of these regressions are largely unchanged and, as earlier, city controls are never signi￿cant
at the 5% con￿dence level.
23respect to housing outcomes. Moreover, it facilitates the comparison of the results in our
paper to others in the literature. All IV regressions are consistent with a causal interpretation
of our results: legal systems that are more protective of investor rights through more e¢ cient
legal contract enforcement tend to have more developed rental markets.
3.2 Contract Enforcement or Alternative Policies?
A potential challenge to our interpretation of the results is that the coe¢ cients on rental
contract enforcement may be capturing the e⁄ects of a highly regulated labor market. Coun-
tries that heavily regulate the rental market may also be countries that heavily regulate the
labor market. Since more rigid labor market regulations may hinder the mobility of workers,
the correlation between rental market legal e¢ ciency and ownership rates might only re￿ ect
the impact of lower worker mobility on housing ownership rates. To address this issue, in
Table 3 we introduce the data on labor market regulations used in Botero, Djankov, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004). Columns 1 through 3 introduce several mea-
sures of labor market regulations: an index measuring the degree of protection of collective
relations laws, the level of protection of labor and employment laws, and the level of pro-
tection of social security laws as de￿ned by Botero et al. (2004). The introduction of these
labor-regulation-environment variables does not a⁄ect signi￿cantly the coe¢ cient of interest.
Interestingly, a more developed social insurance system (with more extensive old age social
security payments, unemployment insurance, and disability payments) is associated with a
thicker rental market, although this result is based on a small sample of 19 countries.23
23The results are certainly consitent with the idea that individuals with less risky income streams have
less of an incentive to "hedge" housing rent risk via ownership (￿ la Sinai and Souleles, 2005).
24A similar concern is that the formalism index be correlated with, and therefore capturing
the impact of, the general level of protection of property rights. Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) have recently suggested that, whereas legal contract enforcement and general property
rights protection levels are positively correlated, the latter variable may be more important to
account for salient economic outcomes, such as GDP per capita. In the context of this paper,
it may be easier for individual households to defend one￿ s property against expropriation from
neighbors, the state, or warlords, than for absentee landlords to avoid such con￿scation. It
would therefore be possible a priori that the coe¢ cient on contract enforcement protection
was simply capturing the impact of general property rights protection on the ability to
purchase and rent out properties. Column 4 in Table 3, where we control for the degree
of property rights protection, shows that this is not the case, but the evidence is certainly
consistent with the idea that the protection of property rights is an additional important
explanatory variable for rental market development.
Another potential issue is the interaction with collateral lending regulations and insti-
tutions. It is plausible that in countries in which repossession after rent non-payment is
di¢ cult, foreclosure on default of a mortgage is also more costly. Poor enforcement of col-
lateralized credit contracts may actually make being a landlord more attractive relative to
being a creditor. Therefore, there is the potential for the omission of credit market legal
enforcement to make us underestimate the negative impact of rental contract enforcement
on the extent of the rental market, ceteris paribus. We show that concern not to be of
much empirical substance in column 5. These results are consistent with those of Chiuri
and Japelli (2001), who also demonstrate that mortgage laws do not have an impact on the
own-versus-rent margin.
25Column 6 controls for the rent control index in Malpezzi and Ball (1991) to show that rent
control regulations are not biasing the results in our regressions. Despite the fact that rent
control legislation may be an additional factor a⁄ecting the size of the rental market, their
correlation with contract enforcement in the data is relatively mild (about 0.25). Finally, in
column 7, we also control for the ￿nancial and time cost of the property registration process,
which we interpret broadly as another proxy for the ine¢ ciency of the regulations and public
services related to the housing market.
None of the seven alternative policy and regulation variables change the conclusion that
lease contract enforcement has a major impact on the development of the rental market.
3.3 A Very Robust Result: Alternative Data Sets
In Table 4 we use the 1993 UID data and our baseline speci￿cation, focusing on the formalism
index. The advantage of the 1993 data is that we can concentrate on the size of the private
rental market, for which we have disaggregate estimates. Countries that enforce rental
contracts ine¢ ciently may opt for providing public rental housing as a substitute for the lack
of a private market, which could bias our previous estimates downward. The disadvantage
of using the 1993 UID is that the Lex Mundi data was collected somewhat later (1999).
However, laws and legal systems cannot be expected to change much during this period
(we do exclude from the regressions the post-Communist transition countries, for which this
assumption is not as sound). Column 1 provides the basic estimate, which is similar to
that obtained with the 1998 UID. In column 2, we limit the data to those cities that are not
included in the 1998 sample. Quite remarkably, this out-of-sample test yields a coe¢ cient on
26investor protection that is statistically not di⁄erent from that in Table 1. Column 3 uses the
"bounced check" instrument and ￿nds the results to be generally consistent with previous
speci￿cations. Finally, in column 4, we explicitly control for the public housing share and
￿nd a slightly stronger impact of contract enforcement on the development of the private
rental market, ceteris paribus.
Finally, as an extra robustness check of the results, we perform similar regressions using
the 1998 United Nations aggregate estimates by country. The problem with these data is
that we have the homeownership rate rather than the percentage of households living in
rental units. The homeownership rate is not generally one minus the rate of renter-occupied
households because there are other possible alternative housing arrangements (public hous-
ing, group quarters, squatters, homelessness). However we think this is a reasonable proxy.24
The advantage of using data aggregated at the country level is that we are not relying on
the selection of major cities in the previous sample.
The results in Table 5 are broadly consistent with the previous speci￿cations. Poorer legal
rental contract enforcement is associated with a higher homeownership rate. Columns 1 and 2
use the UN estimates of national homeownership rates. However, these are less interesting for
our purposes, since they include homeownership in rural areas. In most developing countries
housing ownership in rural areas is related to land ownership (the ownership of the means
24If we use the city data to regress one minus the ownership rate on the tenancy rate we obtain:





R ￿ squared = 0:61
Clearly, the ownership rate is a reasonable, albeit noisy, proxy for the tenancy rate. However, the mea-
surement error in this case may not be independent of the explanatory variable of interest. Less investor-
protective regulation in the rental markets may be correlated with other regulations that a⁄ect the margin
between homeownership and other alternative housing arrangements.
27of production), an issue about which our analysis does not have much to say. We therefore
focus on urban ownership rates (columns 3 and 4) and ￿nd results that are very close to the
ones using the other independent data sources at the city level. The main ￿ndings in the
paper are extremely robust.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a legal contract enforcement theory of the own versus lease decision.
The allocation of ownership rights will minimize enforcement costs when the legal system is
ine¢ cient. In particular, when legal enforcement of contracts is costly, there will be a shift
from arrangements that rely on such enforcement (such as a rental agreement) toward other
forms that do not (such as direct ownership).
We use a cross section of countries and show that in countries with longer times for legal
enforcement of repossession when the tenant does not pay rent, and with more formalistic
(and thus expensive) legal repossession enforcement procedures, the share of households
living in rental units is smaller. In order to avoid endogeneity of the rental market law
with respect to market size, we have used regulations in the case of bounced checks and
legal origins as instruments and obtained similar results. Controlling for the extent of other
labor and housing market regulations does not do away with the importance of contracting
institutions.
In our regressions, rental market contract enforcement e¢ ciency measures are typically
the most statistically robust variables to enter in the di⁄erent speci￿cations. From a hous-
ing market perspective, the results suggest that laws that protect investors￿rights are of
28remarkable importance to the development of the rental market.
From a broader law and economics perspective, our results con￿rm the basic insights
of previous literature relating market development with investor protection. Concretely, we
show that one of the channels through which the legal system a⁄ects market development
and its performance is through its e⁄ects on the allocation of ownership rights. Contracting
institutions matter for economic outcomes of relevance and are bound to have an impact on
welfare.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. A user with parameter ￿ rents if and only if UR (p;￿)￿UO (p;q) ￿
0. For ￿ ￿ b ￿, we have that:
@UO
@￿
= ￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ u
0 (v ￿ ￿ ￿ p) > ￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ u
0 (v ￿ ￿ ￿ p ￿ ￿) =
@UR
@￿
when p = r. Therefore, since owning is better for ￿ = 0, it must also be for any ￿ ￿ b ￿.








= ￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ u
0 (v ￿ ￿ ￿ p) < 0 =
@UR
@￿
and both UO and UR remain constant for ￿ ￿ ￿. Therefore, there exists a unique ￿
￿ ￿ b ￿
such that any ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ wants to own, and any ￿ > ￿






33or no user rents (￿






since UO = u(v ￿ p ￿ ￿) < u(v ￿ r) = UR when q = 0, p = r and ￿ > ￿.
Proof of Proposition 3. Notice that the e¢ ciency of the legal system does not a⁄ect the
utility from owning. Therefore, it su¢ ces to see what happens to the utility from renting
as we increase c. Consider ￿rst a user with ￿ < b ￿ (c). Such a user remains in the property




+ (1 ￿ q). Therefore, he must pay rents that satisfy
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, in order to make investors break even. Let us
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We can then rewrite the utility of renting as:
U
R (￿;c) = q ￿
"Z b ￿(c)
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0 u0 (a(x)) ￿ dF (x)































































where the ￿rst inequality follows from the fact that
R b ￿(c)

















. We can then bound the positive terms in






















. By the de-

















+ (1 ￿ q)
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from the second line.
Consider now a user with ￿ ￿ b ￿ (c). Such a user remains in the property with a smaller









us denote A(x) = v ￿ x ￿ p ￿ ￿ + c ￿
￿









We can then rewrite the utility of renting as:
U
R (￿;c) = q ￿
Z b ￿(c)
0








+ (1 ￿ q)
i
￿ u(B)






































































where the ￿rst inequality follows from a similar calculation as above. Therefore, the utility
from renting is decreasing in c for all users. As a result, the number of users for which renting
yields a higher utility than buying must decrease as c increases. Finally, notice that those
who rent must have ￿ > b ￿ (c), and therefore, UR does not depend on ￿, for them. However,
UO is (weakly) decreasing in ￿, and therefore, if ￿ prefers to rent, any ￿
0 ￿ ￿ must also prefer
to rent. It then follows that there is ￿
￿ (c) such that any ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (c) buys, and any ￿ > ￿
￿ (c)
rents. Since the size of the rental market is decreasing in c, ￿
￿ (c) must be increasing.
35Proof of Proposition 4. From proposition 3, we know that for a given user, UR is





e v ￿ v ￿b ￿ (c) j ￿;c
￿i
denote the expected probability of a user-renter staying. Notice




, with equality when only those users with ￿ > b ￿ (c) rent. Consider
a user with ￿ ￿ b ￿ (c). From proposition 1 we know these users strictly prefer to rent when




= 1, his utility from owning is
U
O (p;￿) = q ￿
Z b ￿(￿)
0
u(v ￿ x ￿ p) ￿ dF (x) + (1 ￿ q) ￿ u(v ￿ ￿ ￿ p)
(Notice that b ￿ (￿) < ￿ = b ￿ (2￿).) If only those with ￿ > b ￿ (c) rent in equilibrium, the utility
for a user with ￿ ￿ b ￿ (c) to deviate and start renting is
U
R (￿;c) = q ￿
"Z b ￿(c)
0








+ (1 ￿ q) ￿ u(A(￿))
where A(x) and B are as de￿ned in the proof of proposition 3. Notice that for such a user,
owning is still preferred whenever c ￿ ￿=(1 ￿ q), since u(v ￿ x ￿ p) ￿ u(v ￿ p) ￿ u(B)
when x ￿ b ￿ (￿) = v ￿ v and u(v ￿ x ￿ p) ￿ u(A(x)).25 Furthermore, when c > ￿=(1 ￿ q)




u(A(x)) ￿ dF (x) + (1 ￿ q) ￿ u(A(￿))
which is larger than UO when ￿ ￿ ￿ since u(v ￿ x ￿ p ￿ ￿ + c ￿ (1 ￿ q)) > u(v ￿ x ￿ p) and
25The last inequality follows from the fact that A(x) = v ￿ x ￿ p ￿ ￿ + c
￿




￿ v ￿ x ￿ p










36u(v ￿ ￿ ￿ p ￿ ￿ + c ￿ (1 ￿ q)) > u(v ￿ ￿ ￿ p).
All ￿ ￿ b ￿ (c) prefer to own as long as c ￿ (1 ￿ q) ￿ ￿. Therefore, for c ￿ ￿=(1 ￿ q), any









strictly prefer to rent. This would
cause P e to discontinuously jump upward at c = ￿=(1 ￿ q), and an equilibrium cannot be
sustained. When we increase c marginally above ￿=(1 ￿ q), if no ￿ ￿ b ￿ (c) is supposed to
rent, then they all have an incentive to deviate and start renting. However, if they all rent,
P e must go up discretely, increasing the ￿rst period rent, and causing the utility of renting
to jump downward and become lower than that of owning for these users.
In order to obtain an equilibrium when c > ￿=(1 ￿ q), investors must increase ￿rst
period rents above the expected cost, in order to prevent any ￿ ￿ b ￿ (c) from renting. This
requires setting rents to satisfy r1 + r2 = p + c ￿ P (c), where P (c) satis￿es the equation
c(1 ￿ P (c)) = ￿, whenever c > ￿=(1 ￿ q). By doing this, all ￿ ￿ b ￿ (c) are indi⁄erent
between buying and renting (and can then be assumed to buy). Hence, all renters have
￿ > b ￿ (c). Yet, since P (c) > P e for any such renter, their utility of renting goes below that
that would be achieved under perfect discrimination (UR is decreasing in P (c)). As a result,
the size of the rental market must be smaller.










, in case they started to pool with the high mobility users. Then, such a




+(1 ￿ q)￿￿(c), where the





is su¢ ciently low, ￿(c) must be arbitrarily close to one. The rents would almost re￿ ect the
37probability of staying for any of the low mobility users. Hence, they must prefer to own at
that point, and no pooling of low and high mobility users exists.
Finally, notice that investors must be making strictly positive pro￿ts when P (c) > P e.
This can be sustained in equilibrium if there are more investors than renters. There will be
entry until the point where expected pro￿ts fall down to zero again, as some of the investors
will not be able to obtain a rent for their property.
38Figure 1 
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Formalism Index: Rental Market
Ownership Rate: Urban Fitted values
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Formalism Index (Repossession Legal Process) -0.084 -0.064 -0.095 -0.114 -0.087 -0.107 -0.135 -0.088 -0.091 -0.117 -0.087
(0.020)*** (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.027)*** (0.023)*** (0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.032)*** (0.033)**
ln(Total Duration of Repossession Legal Process) -0.075 -0.041 -0.02 0.001 -0.024 -0.005 -0.002 -0.03 -0.048 -0.027 -0.063
(0.025)*** (0.031) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.038) (0.028) (0.047)
ln(GNP per capita) -0.013 -0.019 -0.008 -0.021 0.005 -0.024 -0.004 -0.046 -0.021
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.021) (0.016) (0.039) (0.013)*** (0.035)
ln(Population Density) -0.037 -0.055 -0.038 -0.041 -0.053 -0.031 -0.042 -0.07 -0.026
(0.020)* (0.018)*** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)*** -0.021 (0.019)** (0.016)*** (0.022)
ln(Victims of Theft /'000) -0.005
(0.013)
Areas considered as dangerous or inaccessible to the police -0.053
(0.034)
ln(Travel Time per Work-Trip (mins)) 0.041
(0.048)
ln(Local Government Revenue per Capita) -0.035
(0.018)*
ln(Share Households with Access to Water) 0.042
(0.056)
ln(Median Household Income per Month) 0.003
(0.040)
ln( Total Population ('000) - Urban Agglomeration) 0.008
(0.015)
ln(Under 5 Mortality ) -0.042
(0.052)
Constant 0.626 0.703 0.762 1.018 1.114 0.997 0.928 1.192 1.122 1.112 1.455 1.115
(0.088)*** (0.133)*** (0.139)*** (0.237)*** (0.286)*** (0.222)*** (0.275)*** (0.244)*** (0.242)*** (0.225)*** (0.255)*** (0.248)***
Observations 102 102 102 102 82 102 84 72 98 66 61 70
Number of Countries 47 47 47 47 38 47 36 32 45 35 29 37
R-squared 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.3 0.52 0.34 0.25 0.41 0.29 0.26 0.3
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Tenancy Share (Rental Households/ Total Number of Households)
TABLE 1
Rental Contract Enforcement and Rental Market Development
The table presents the results of OLS regressions with the share of householdsliving in rental units in a city in 1998 as the left-hand-side variable. The main explanatoryvariables are the
formalism index (a measure of how costly is the enfocerment of contracts by courts) and the average length of the legal repossession process in the case of rent non-payment in the
country where the city is located. GNP per capita, and population density are the main controls at the country level. Columns 5 to 12 include other city-level controls. See Data Appendix
for details.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formalism Index (Repossession Legal Process) -0.071 -0.091 -0.053 -0.074
(0.017)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)** (0.037)*
ln(GNP per capita) -0.008 -0.005
(0.015) (0.018)
ln(Population Density) -0.039 -0.035
(0.020)* (0.022)
Constant 0.576 0.87 0.51 0.771
(0.076)*** (0.251)*** (0.091)*** (0.341)**
Observations 102 102 102 102
Number of Countries 47 47 47 47
F-statistic of excluded variables 139.31 261.89 38.46 28.94
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table presents the results of IV regressions with the share of households living in rental units in a 
city in 1998 as the left-hand-side variable. The main explanatory variables are the formalism index of 
the legal repossession process in the case of rent non-payment in the country where the city is located  
(a measure of how costly is the enfocerment of contracts by courts). This variable is instrumented, 
respectively, by the formalism index and average legal duration of court involvement in the case of a 
bounced check (columns 1 and 2), and by a set of dummies indicating the legal origin of the country 
(columns 3 and 4). GNP per capita, and population density are the main controls at the country level. 
See Data Appendix for details.
IV estimates
TABLE 2





Instruments(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Formalism Index (Repossession Legal Process) -0.115 -0.113 -0.083 -0.101 -0.106 -0.125 -0.107
(0.029)*** (0.034)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.022)***
ln(GNP per capita) -0.008 -0.008 0.018 -0.034 -0.006 -0.038 -0.02
(0.020) (0.028) (0.016) (0.018)* (0.022) (0.015)** -0.019
ln(Population Density) -0.038 -0.044 -0.021 -0.045 -0.038 -0.062 -0.039
(0.021)* (0.035) (0.034) (0.019)** (0.021)* (0.016)*** (0.019)**
Level of Protection of Industrial Relations Laws 0.01  
(0.075)
Level of Protection of Labor and Employment Laws 0.076
(0.152)
Level of Protection of Social Security Laws  0.294
(0.085)***
Property Rights Index, 1997 0.052
(0.026)*
Legal Creditor Rights Index - Collateral Lending -0.005
(0.024)
Rent Control Index -0.323
(0.307)
Log Time to Property Registration -0.028
(0.024)
Log Cost of Property Registration 0.0001
(0.024)
Constant 0.922 0.963 -0.06 0.947 0.93 1.352 1.127
(0.266)*** (0.396)** (0.335) (0.245)*** (0.210)*** (0.263)*** (0.272)***
Observations 92 59 59 98 98 53 100
Number of Countries 39 19 19 46 44 23 45
R-squared 0.27 0.25 0.35 0.27 0.23 0.47 0.26
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Rental Contract Enforcement or Other Regulations?
TABLE 3
The table presents the results of OLS regressions with the share of households living in rental units in a city in 1998 as the left-hand-
side variable. The main explanatory variable is the formalism index (a measure of how costly is the enfocerment of contracts by 
courts) in the case of rent non-payment. In columns 1, 2, and 3 we control for country-level indexes measuring, respectively, the 
extent of protection to unions and collective bargaining, the extent of labor market regulation, and the level of protection of social 
security in the country. In column 4 we control for an index measuring the extent of property rights protection. Column 5 controls for 
a measure of the extent of protection of creditor rights (including lender rights on the collateral in asset-backed lending 
transactions). In column 6 we add a rent control index. Column 7 controls for the costs and lenght of the real estate propery 
registration process. See Data Appendix for details.
Rental Share(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formalism Index (Repossession Legal Process) -0.069 -0.062 -0.057 -0.08
(0.029)** (0.031)** (0.029)* (0.029)***
ln(GNP per capita) 0.00002 -0.013 0.001 0.012
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
ln(Population Density) -0.015 -0.02 -0.014 -0.004
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
Share Public Housing -0.417
(0.178)**
Constant 0.622 0.69 0.566 0.547
(0.235)** (0.234)*** (0.244)** (0.238)**
Observations 114 63 114 114
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.16
Countries 47 30 47 47
Regression Description Baseline






Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Share Private Rental Households
TABLE 4
1993 Private Rental Data
Columns 1 and 2 present the results of OLS regressions with the share of households living in privately-owned
rental units in a city in 1993 as the left-hand-side variable. The main explanatory variable is the formalism index
(a measure of how costly is the enfocerment of contracts by courts) in the case of rent non-payment. In column
2, we only include those cities that are not available in the 1998 data set (this can be interpreted as an out-of-
sample test of the robustness of the main result in Table 1). Column 3 presents results of IV regressions using
the formalism index in the case of a bounced check as an instrument. Column 4 controls for the share of public
housing in the city. See Data Appendix for details.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formalism Index (Repossession Legal Process) 0.046 0.025 0.055 0.067
(0.023)** (0.023) (0.024)** (0.032)**
ln(GNP per capita) -0.027 0.033
(0.015)* (0.025)
ln(Population Density) 0.002 -0.019
(0.017) (0.014)
Constant 0.504 0.812 0.405 0.154
(0.087)*** (0.190)*** (0.098)*** (0.325)
Observations 41 40 34 34
R-squared 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Columns 1 and 2 present the results of OLS regressions with estimates on the share of households
in a country living in owner-occupied housing as the left-hand-side variable. The main explanatory
variable is the formalism index (a measure of how costly is the enfocerment of contracts by courts)
in the case of rent non-payment. In columns 3 and 4 (the focal regressions of interest) we use the
ownership rate in urban areas. See Data Appendix for details.
Courts and Homeownership (National Data)
TABLE 5
Urban Rural & Urban
Homeownership RateN Mean St.DV. Min Max
Total Duration of Repossession Legal Process 102 262.260 253.767 39 1080
Formalism Index (Repossession Legal Process) 102 3.680 0.907 2.153 5.569
GNP per capita  102 7893.357 10811.840 260 31910.160
Population Density (people per sq km) 102 185.204 663.941 2.301 6586.885
Tenancy Share 102 0.315 0.192 0 0.86
Victims of Theft /'000 82 14.316 17.041 0.020 85.300
Areas considered as dangerous or inaccessible to the police 102 0.347 0.478 0 1
Travel Time per Work-Trip (mins) 84 28.702 11.978 5 62
Local government revenue per capita 72 611.291 937.994 2.190 4637.900
Share Households with Access to Water 98 0.847 0.235 0.116 1
Median Household Income per Month 65 600.249 794.994 41.000 3767
Total Population ('000) - Urban Agglomeration 61 1667.868 2096.379 6.500 8769.341
Under 5 Mortality  85 0.033 0.039 0.001 0.170




Descriptive Statistics (1998 City Data)Data Appendix
Variable Source Description
Total Duration 
Djankov,  La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2003). 
The total estimated duration in calendar 
days of the reposession procedure after 
non-payment of due rents. It equals the 
sum of: (i) duration until completion of 
service of process, (ii) duration of trial, 
and (iii) duration of enforcement.*
Formalism Index
Djankov,  La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2003). 
The index measures substantive and 
procedural statutory intervention in 
judicial repossesion cases at lower-level 
civil trial courts, and is formed by 
adding up the following indices: (i) 
professionals vs. laymen, (ii) written vs. 
oral elements, (iii) legal justification, 
(iv) statutory regulation of evidence, (v) 
control of superior review, (vi) 
engagement formalities, and (vii) 
independent procedural actions. The 
index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means 
a higher level of control or intervention 
in the judicial process.*
GNP per Capita
Djankov,  La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2003). 
Population Density (people per sq km)
World Development Indicators (WDI) 
World Bank (2004)
Level of Protection of Industrial 
(Collective) Relations Laws
Botero, Djankov, Laporta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, (2005)
This index measures the level of legal 
protection of the right to unionization 
and collective bargaining. The index is 
the normalized sum of 3 original indexes 
as constructed by Botero et al: (i) labor 
union power, (ii) right to unionization in 
the constitution, (iii) right to collective 
bargaining in the constitution.
Level of Protection of Labor and 
Employment Laws
Botero, Djankov, Laporta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, (2005)
This index measures the level of 
protection of labor and employment 
laws. The index is formed by the 
normalized sum of 3 original indexes 
constructed by Botero et al: (i) 
alternative employment contracts, (ii) 
conditions of employment, (iii)  job 
security. Level of Protection of Social Security 
Laws (Old Age, Unemployment, 
Sickness)
Botero, Djankov, Laporta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, (2005)
This index measures the level of 
protection of social security laws. The 
index is formed by the normalized sum 
of 3 original indexes as calculated by 
Botero et al.: (i) subindex of old age, 
disability and death benefits; (ii) 
subindex of sickness and health benefits; 
and (iii) subindex of unemployment 
benefits. 
Property Rights Index, 1997
La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1999) - From Heritage 
Foundation 1997 Index of Economic 
Freedom
A subjective index that scores the degree 
to which a country’s laws and 
government protect private property 
rights and the degree to which its 
government enforces those laws. Takes 
on 5 values (from Very Low, 1, to Very 
High, 5)
Legal Creditor Rights Index - 
Collateral Lending
World Bank Doing Business Database 
2005 (DB), and Djankov, McLiesh, 
Shleifer (2006)
The DB creditor protection index adds 
seven indexes pertaining to collateral 
law and 3 indexes pertaining to 
bankruptcy law. We subtract the values 
for the 3 latter indexes from Djankov et 
al. to obtain our measure of collateral 
lending creditor protection
Rent Control Index Malpezzi and Ball (1991)
It is obtained as the sum of several 
indexes measuring several aspects of the 
coverage, stricness, and enforcement of 
rent control regulations
Time and Cost of Property Registration
World Bank doing Business Database 
2005 (DB)
Assumes a standardized case of an 
entrepreneur who wants to purchase land 
and a building in the largest business 
city—already registered and free of title 
dispute. Time is measured in days. Cost 
is expressed as a percentage of the value 
of the building.
Areas considered as dangerous or 
inaccessible to the police UN Global Urban Indicators, 1998
Areas considered as dangerous or 
inaccessible to the police (yes or no)
Travel Time per Word Trip (mins) UN Global Urban Indicators, 1998
Average time in minutes for a one-way 
work trip. This is an average over all 
modes of transport.
Local Government Revenue per Capita UN Global Urban Indicators, 1998
Local government revenue per capita is 
the total local government sources of 
funds in US dollars annually, both 
capital and recurrent, for the 
metropolitan area, divided by population 
(three-year average). Under 5 Mortality - All UN Global Urban Indicators, 1998
Percentage of female and male children 
who die before reaching their fifth 
birthday.
Percentage Household with Access to 
Water UN Global Urban Indicators, 1998
Access is defined as having water 
located within 200 meters of the 
dwelling. 
Median Household Income per Month UN Global Urban Indicators, 1998
Median household income: Household 
income is defined as the gross income 
from all sources, which include wages, 
salaries, incomes from businesses or 
informal sector activities, investment 
income, and where information is 
available, income in-kind.
Total Population ('000) - Urban 
Agglomeration UN Global Urban Indicators, 1998
Total population is based on the de facto 
definition of population, which counts 
all residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship. Urban agglomeration is 
defined as the city proper along with the 
suburban fringe and any built-up, thickly 
settled areas lying outside of, but 
adjacent to, the city boundaries. 
Tenancy Share  UN Global Urban Indicators, 1998
Households in rental housing over total 
number of households. This information 
is usually collected through the census 
or household surveys. In the absence of 
such sources, an evaluation might be 
carried out using several indirect sources 
collected through public housing boards, 
housing finance institutions, real-estate 
agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, etc.
Share Private Rental Households UN Global Urban Indicators, 1993
Households in private rental over total 
number of households. Private rental is 
defined as households in (formal) 
housing for which rents are paid to a 
private landlord who is the legal owner.
Homeownership Rate (Urban and 
Overall)
UN Human Settlements Statistical 
Database version 4, 1999
Percent of total households that are 
owner occupied.